Which cannabis reforms have been attempted in the Congreso, and why they do not get through
The legislative initiatives tabled in Spain's lower house, how far each one got, and the constitutional and international obstacles that hold them back.
August 3, 2026
Across several parliamentary terms, a number of proposiciones de ley (bills tabled by parliamentary groups rather than by the government) on cannabis have been registered in the Congreso de los Diputados (Spain's lower house) — some proposing comprehensive regulation of adult use, others limited to medical use, one aimed at expressly recognising the association model — and none has been passed. The only ground on which parliamentary work left a normative result was the medical one, and that arrived later by regulation, not by act of parliament. For cannabis associations the practical consequence is direct: there is no state-level rule that regulates them, and where they stand still depends on how the courts read shared consumption.
Understanding why no reform gets through means looking at three planes at once: parliamentary procedure, which lets most initiatives lapse before they are ever voted on their merits; the division of powers between the state and the comunidades autónomas (Spain's regional governments), which closed off the regional route; and the international commitments Spain has signed, which set the margin for any state-level text. This article sets out those three planes and the positions at stake without taking sides.
The bills that were tabled, and how far they got
Two distinct instruments are often confused when these initiatives are discussed. A proyecto de ley (government bill) is presented by the government and reaches parliament backed by the Council of Ministers, which in practice guarantees that it will be processed. A proposición de ley is registered by a parliamentary group and has to clear a prior filter before processing even begins: the full house must agree to take it into consideration. That difference at the starting line explains much of what has happened to the cannabis texts.
The group tables the text and the Bureau of the chamber qualifies it and orders its publication. This stage is almost always automatic, and it is the one that produces headlines about "the cannabis law being tabled" when in fact nothing has yet been debated.
The full house votes on whether to open processing. This is the decisive filter: if the majority votes against, the initiative dies that same day. A good share of the cannabis proposals never even reach this debate, because the plenary agenda is set by the Junta de Portavoces (the committee of parliamentary spokespersons) and initiatives with no prior agreement can wait indefinitely.
Once past the filter, the window for tabling amendments opens. That window can be extended week after week, and a sustained extension is one of the standard ways to freeze a text without having to reject it formally.
Only after that come the votes in committee and in the full house, the passage through the Senate and publication in the BOE (the official state gazette). No initiative on regulating adult cannabis use has reached this stage in Spain.
On top of those filters sits one that acts on its own: lapse. When a parliamentary term ends and the Cortes are dissolved, pending business falls. A text registered mid-term and not voted on disappears with the electoral calendar, and a group that wants to insist has to register it again in the following term and start from scratch. On a subject that has never been among the priorities of any investiture agreement, that clock alone has been enough to shelve several initiatives without anyone having to vote them down.
| Type of initiative | What it proposes | How far it has got so far |
|---|---|---|
| Comprehensive regulation of adult use | A complete framework for production, access and control for adults, with varying degrees of openness depending on the text | Not passed. Those tabled have lapsed at the end of the term or have not cleared the prior filter |
| Regulation of medical use | A health-system route to preparations for therapeutic purposes | Did not succeed as an act of parliament, but the matter was eventually dealt with by regulation |
| Recognition of the association model | Requirements, limits and a dedicated register for associations of people who use cannabis | Not passed at state level in any parliamentary term |
| Non-legislative motions | They urge the government to study or promote regulation | They carry no normative force: even when passed, they change no rule |
| Regional acts | A region's own framework for associations | Annulled or cut back by the Tribunal Constitucional |
| State regulatory route | Development of one specific case by royal decree | The only route with a published result, and limited to the health field |
The medical cannabis subcommittee and its outcome
The furthest any of this went in parliament was not a law but a subcommittee set up in the Congreso to examine experiences of regulating cannabis for medical purposes. A subcommittee does not legislate: witnesses appear, models are studied, and a report with conclusions addressed to the government is approved.
Two features explain why its outcome disappointed some and reassured others. The first is the narrow remit: the mandate concerned medical use, so adult consumption and the association model were outside the debate from the outset. The second is the reach of the instrument: a subcommittee report approves nothing by itself, it passes recommendations to the government, so any practical effect depended on the administration developing them afterwards.
That the development came by regulation, rather than from the Congreso itself, illustrates another feature of the subject: even where there is parliamentary agreement on a narrow patch of ground, the next step is neither automatic nor still in the chamber's hands. What that health route contains — who prescribes, where it is dispensed and what it does not authorise — is set out in the article on medical cannabis in Spain. What matters here is that this rule does not touch associations at any point.
The obstacles over legislative powers
The second barrier is not political but about who holds the power to legislate. The Spanish Constitution reserves criminal legislation and legislation on pharmaceutical products to the state, along with public safety. That means a region cannot declare lawful what a state criminal rule prohibits, however much its act is presented as a health, association or harm-reduction measure.
That doctrine is not theoretical: it has been applied to the regions that tried to order the sector on their own. The Tribunal Constitucional (Spain's constitutional court) has resolved the challenges brought against those regional rules with a common line of reasoning: creating requirements, licences or registers for clubs amounts to drawing the boundary of what is criminally permitted, and that falls to the state. The detail of each case is in the annulment of the Catalan act and in the Basque act on cannabis clubs; the full map, in the differences between regions.
When a region sets requirements, licences or registers for associations, it is in practice drawing the line around which conduct falls outside criminal blame. That line is for the state to draw, whatever title the regional rule carries and whichever field — health, associations or consumption — it claims to sit in.
The corollary is uncomfortable for anyone hoping for a local solution: the regional route is closed, and any real change would have to come from the Congreso. But it complicates the state route too, because a coherent reform would not be settled by "a cannabis law". It would have to fit together, at the same time, the criminal rule that punishes promoting, favouring or facilitating unlawful use; the public safety rules that penalise use and possession in public space — described in fines for use in public spaces — and health regulation. Three blocks with different majorities, different ministries and different timetables.
International treaties as a limit
The third plane is supranational. Spain is party to the United Nations conventions on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which oblige signatory states to limit the production and use of cannabis to medical and scientific purposes, and to the convention against illicit trafficking that reinforces that enforcement. Compliance is monitored by an international body that publishes annual reports naming the countries that depart from the framework.
That limit has been loosened, but it has not gone away. The removal of cannabis from the most restrictive schedule of the 1961 convention, approved by the competent United Nations commission, reclassified the substance within the international control system without taking it out of that system. And at European level, the common rule on drug trafficking sets minimum criminal penalties but leaves outside its scope conduct intended for personal use, as each country defines it.
The countries that have passed non-commercial access frameworks have all steered around the same point: sale for profit. Home growing, non-profit associations or personal quantities fit within a flexible reading of the treaties; a chain of shops does not. The comparative picture is in where cannabis is legal in Europe, and the contrast with the German model, in German clubs compared with Spanish ones.
None of this is an absolute impediment: there are states outside Europe that legalised commercial markets while accepting the clash with the treaties. It is, rather, a diplomatic and legal cost that no Spanish majority has so far been willing to take on, and a recurring argument for those who oppose reform.
What the federations are asking for
The federations that group cannabis associations together have been asking for the same thing for years, in varying formulations: legal certainty. Their argument is that the association model has existed in fact for decades and works without written rules, so that the same activity can be tolerated in one province and prosecuted in another depending on how a court weighs the evidence in a given case. Their usual demands include legal recognition of the model, clear and verifiable criteria on who may join and on what terms, a dedicated register that makes it possible to tell compliant entities apart, and a sharp separation from sale for profit.
The opposing positions rest on other arguments, equally present in the parliamentary debate: the risk that permissive regulation would serve as cover for commercial structures, public health objections about normalising use, and the discomfort of granting legal recognition to a model the international treaties do not contemplate. Between the two extremes there are intermediate positions that accept regulating the health route and rule out touching anything else — which is precisely what has happened.
What would change for associations
Today a cannabis association is set up under the general right of association, and its activity is assessed case by case in the light of the doctrine of shared consumption, with no specific licence, no sectoral inspection and no register identifying it as such. What exactly this model is, is explained in what a cannabis club is.
Exactly what would change would depend on the text that ended up being passed. But any regulation would have to answer in writing questions that appear in no rule today: who may join and under what requirements, what limits on quantities and capacity apply, which administration would inspect and penalise what is now weighed in criminal proceedings, and whether there would be a register separating recognised entities from the rest. That is where the debate splits again: those calling for reform see in that picture the legal certainty they are asking for, while other voices within the sector hold that a written framework would leave some current entities outside it and tighten what is now looser, starting with access for people passing through.
Every time an initiative is registered in the Congreso, or a health rule is approved, the same commercial line reappears: "it's legal now", "under the new law we're regulated", "we have a licence". A bill that has been registered changes nothing, and a rule on medical use does not regulate the association model. Other signals of this kind are gathered in the signs that a club is not complying and in the most repeated myths about clubs.
The hub by locality is on the cities page, and the legal framework in force, with everything that stays the same for as long as the Congreso passes nothing, in the article on the legality of cannabis in Spain.
Frequently asked questions
Is there already a cannabis law in Spain?
No. There is no state-level act regulating adult use or cannabis associations. The only thing passed is a regulation on medical use, which creates a narrow health-system route and does not affect the association model.
Why do bills lapse without being voted on?
For two combined reasons. A proposición de ley needs the full house to agree to take it into consideration, and that debate is only scheduled if there is agreement to put it on the agenda. On top of that, all pending business lapses when the Cortes are dissolved, so a text that has not been voted on disappears at the end of the parliamentary term.
Can a region regulate clubs on its own?
No. The Tribunal Constitucional annulled or cut back the regional rules that tried, because drawing the line of what is lawful in this area touches criminal legislation, an exclusive power of the state. Any change with real effects would have to be passed in the Congreso.
If a reform were passed, would anything change for members?
It would depend on the text. A written rule would have to set admission conditions, limits and administrative controls where today there is a case-by-case assessment before the courts. A regulated framework does not in itself mean easier access.
